Since 2006, as part of the transition to low-carbon technologies, UK energy policy has moved towards incentivising new nuclear power production. As a result, the UK has developed a (now delayed) strategy to deliver around 16 GW of new nuclear power by 2030. This policy context provides an opportunity to reflect not only on the material infrastructure needed to meet transition targets, but also on who is responsible for the energy justice implications of these decisions. Using data collected from 26 semi-structured interviews with NGO and policy representatives, this paper presents a case study of energy justice concerns surrounding the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex in Somerset, focusing particularly on the highly controversial Hinkley Point C developments. The results emphasise the importance of considering not only instances of energy justice or injustice, but of attributing responsibility for them, a concept that has been largely overlooked in the energy justice literature. NGOs, government and business allocate responsibility differently in nuclear energy decision-making. We find that perceptions of responsibility are highly dependent upon the level of transparency in decision-making.
Introduction
Since 2006, United Kingdom (UK) energy policy has moved towards incentivising new nuclear power production, proposing the first new reactor since the construction of Sizewell B in 1986 . This policy reversion is partly a response to the national desire for a shift towards low-carbon technologies (Florini and Sovacool 2009; DECC 2011a,b; Watson and Scott 2009) , and partly to a projected energy gap caused by existing facilities coming to the end of their operational lifespans; planned decommissioning means that by 2020 the UK's total nuclear capacity will have reduced by around three quarters (BERR 2008; Bickerstaff et al. 2008 ) (although most recent estimates show that only two power plants will close by 2023, and the rest are anticipated to run until around 2028). Even with lifetime extensions on some pre-existing facilities, new energy production infrastructure will be required. As a result, the UK has developed a (now delayed) strategy to deliver around 16 GW of new nuclear by 2030, with proposed facilities at Hinkley Point, Sizewell, Wylfa, Oldbury and Moorside (BIS 2013) . The UK's change in attitudes to nuclear power provides an opportunity to reflect not only on what material infrastructure is needed to fulfil policy goals, but also on who is responsible for the energy justice implications that these decisions carry.
In a definition provided by Jenkins et al. (2016a) , the energy justice concept exists to evaluate (a) where injustices emerge, (b) which affected sections of society are ignored, and (c) which processes exist for their remediation in order to reveal and reduce such injustices. The emphasis to date has been on identifying who is ignored and, as a consequence, on identifying strategies for remediation . The literature on energy justice has focused on the fuel poor (Middlemiss and Gillard 2015; Chard and Walker 2016; Hiteva 2013; Sovacool 2015; Teller-Elsberg et al. 2016; Walker and Day 2012) , disabled or unwell members of society (Snell et al. 2015; Liddell et al. 2016) , poor and ethnic communities who historically shouldered the burden of toxic waste dumps (Williams 1999; Davis 2009; Reames 2016 ) and anti-wind campaigners (Jenkins et al. 2016a) , amongst others. This paper investigates this issue by considering the question of 'justice by whom?', using a case study approach to identify who, in the case of UK nuclear energy developments, is perceived to be responsible for tackling energy justice concerns.
The paper begins with an introduction to the energy justice concept and tenets and an exploration of the questions 'justice for whom' and 'justice by whom', articulating a conceptual call to expand the energy justice literature to consider notions of responsibility. The next section provides the research design of our study, explaining why we focus on Hinkley Point as our case study and the data collection and analysis methods used. The paper then presents and discusses the results, reflecting on the implications of dispersed and centralised models of responsibility, which emerge from the research interviews. We make the case for the need to increase transparency in nuclear energy in order to allow more sophisticated understandings of responsibility to emerge. The final section on policy implications calls for a more systematic inclusion of responsibility into ethics and justice explorations in relation to energy decision-making more broadly.
Energy justice and Responsibility
According to McCauley et al. (2013: 1) energy justice seeks "to provide all individuals, across all areas, with safe, affordable and sustainable energy". It is concerned with principles of equity and fairness in energy-related decisionmaking and infrastructural development, and is guided by a normative aim to reduce injustice. McCauley et al. (2013 McCauley et al. ( , 2016 and Jenkins et al. (2016a) use three core tenets to operationalise this aim: distributional justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition. In their work, distributional justice refers to the unequal distribution of environmental benefits and ills and their associated responsibilities; procedural justice highlights the importance of procedure in influencing whether outcomes for stakeholders are equitable or inequitable; and justice as recognition encapsulates the aspiration for individuals to be fairly represented, to be free from physical threats and to be offered complete and equal political rights. Other frameworks, such as the work of and Sovacool et al. (2016) , include cosmopolitanism as an additional tenet. Table 1 provides a summary of the implications of the tenet approach when examined across the evaluative and normative contributions.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
This paper seeks to add to this literature by focusing on the notion of responsibility. We position this within the context of the justice as recognition tenet. For some, the focus is almost exclusively on matters of distribution (Vincent 1998; Dobson 1998) , whereas for others justice as recognition is acknowledged, but only as a tacitly included element in the ideal definition of distribution and/or participation (Schlosberg 2004) . Fraser (1999: 98) highlights that some perceive it to be a "false consciousness", and a hindrance to the pursuit of social justice.
However, following both Fraser (1999 Fraser ( , 2001 Fraser ( , 2009 Fraser ( , 2014 and Young (2011) , and in keeping with McCauley et al. (2013) , this paper includes justice as recognition as the third tenet and argues that it provides a key role in identifying not only who is affected by energy justice, but also who is responsible for it.
The energy justice literature has not fully explored who is responsible for energy justice and/or its remediation -an aspect of justice that is prominent in environmental and climate justice debates (see Bulkeley et al. 2013 Bulkeley et al. , 2014 Barrett 2013 Barrett , 2014 ) -thrust to prominence by the works of Iris Young (2004; 2008; 2010; 2011) . In the environmental justice literature, responsibility is acknowledged as a key principle, particularly in relation to future generations (see Reese and Jacob 2015; Syme et al. 2014; and Grineski et al. 2012) . In this context, both Reese and Jacob (2015) and Syme et al. (2014) note that justice appraisals represent a moral basis of behaviour for environmental protection. The same is true of the climate justice movement, where "common but undifferentiated responsibilities" underpin international negotiations (Shaw 2016: 512; UNFCCC 1992) and represent a key theme in the literature. In both cases, recognising the needs or existence of particular groups is entangled with a need to identify who is responsible for enacting just actions towards them. This paper expands this exploration into the energy justice literature and argues for a focus not only on questions of 'justice for whom?', as is typically the case, but also on 'justice by whom? ' Sovacool et al. (2016: 1) offer one approach to responsibility within energy justice literature when they state that "an important dimension to justice goes beyond concepts and analysis to decisions and thus decision-making, including policy-makers and regulators as well as ordinary students, jurists, homeowners, businesspersons, investors, and consumers". Heffron and McCauley (2017) refer to this approach as placing responsibility as a key applied principle for practicing energy justice. This highlights that we all bear the burden of creating energy justice, even when we make the most mundane energy choices such as turning on a light switch. This builds upon Young (2011) who points to the dispersion of responsibility throughout society from previously individualised incarnations which focused only on the family unit. Further, Heffron and McCauley (2014: 437) add that "justice is concerned with social responsibility by the private sector, the government and the public. The choices that they make will have a significant impact upon both global climate change, and in particular, inter-generational justice". Neither statement, however, engages with the power differentials in each group, their awareness of the challenges, or their range of capabilities.
Here we argue that if the purpose of energy justice is to serve as an analytical tool and move beyond academic discourse -as has been suggested by Heffron et al. (2015) , Sovacool and Dworkin (2015) , Sovacool et al. (2014) and Jenkins et al. (2016b) -it must sufficiently 'politicize' its focus in order to avoid naivety in expecting responsibility where it is not assumed. Indeed, we recognize in line with Young (2011) that if structural injustices are to be tackled, models of responsibility must transition from an individualized, family-based focus to collective cosmopolitan incarnations where individuals recognise their connections beyond their immediate family setting. Thus, this research focuses on understanding when groups are perceived to be responsible for and capable of directly tackling energy injustices. We present below the interpretations of NGOs, companies, and government towards responsibility. Before analysing the results, we outline our methodological approach in the next section. We note here, that there is insufficient space to cover the background of nuclear policy or ethical issues of nuclear in general. Although we do concentrate on the Hinkley Point complex we use this only as an initial exploratory case study and a lens to explore this issue.
Research Design
This section outlines the key components of the research design. We provide, firstly, some key background information on the case study for this paper, Hinkley Point, in order to give context to our findings. We selected Hinkley Point for this paper as the case study where the issue of responsibility arose the most in our interview data. The mechanism for research data collection and analysis is then detailed before covering the results in the next section. (Černoch and Zapletalová 2015) , sparking debate about the necessity and environmental and social implications of nuclear power. Indeed, the Hinkley Point C project has faced critiques, including, but not limited to, concern over state-aid inquiries, the formation of a finance consortium or lack thereof, loan guarantees, the collapse and refinancing of Areva, and reactor vessel design faults following issues in the construction of a sister facility -the Flamanville reactor in France (Thomas 2016) . Nuttall and Earp (2014) 
Data Collection and Analysis
This research used interviews as the core method, in line with other studies on nuclear new build (see Heffron 2013; Jasper 1990; Hecht 1998 , RAE 2010 and nuclear energy policy (Stoler 1985 , Morone and Woodhouse 1989 , Perin 2005 , Rehner and McCauley 2016 . The sample of interview participants comprised members of the NGO and policy elite, reflecting the study's primary focus on energy justice as a mode of policy critique. Elites are recognised as groups or individuals holding comparatively more power, privilege and political influence than lay populations. Respondents were, in this regard, both elite and expert. We sampled representatives from the most prominent NGO and policy groups engaged with the research case study. For the purposes of this work, NGOs are defined in line with Lewis (2014: 3) as '"third sector", not-for-profit organisations concerned with addressing problems of global poverty and social justice'. Lewis identifies that these groups are normally linked with the concept of charity, while others give them more political motivations as 'civil society organisations', groups of organised citizens independent from the government or business sectors. This distinction justifies their treatment as a separate sample group from policy respondents.
Data were obtained via 26 semi-structured, oral history interviews, taking place between 1 st November 2014 and 1 st January 2016. Interview questions were formed in the light of the preliminary readings, the research rationale, and the research question. The participants were sampled through direct snowballing, where individuals were contacted directly and either following interview or a decline to participate, were asked to recommend appropriate alternatives (LewisBeck et al. 2004) . During the snowballing process, 56 individuals and organisations were contacted with invitations to participate in the research.
Those who did not participate cited a range of reasons, including unavailability and conflicts of interest.
Our aim was to provide a robust account of the contours of extant discourses (McDonald 2013). It was recognised that this approach tends to generate perspectives similar to those of the person recommending other interviewees. However, given the sensitive nature of the nuclear industry and organisations involved, this was determined to be the best means of accessing interviews. Throughout, the views of participants are not taken to represent their associated organisations or peers. To protect the identities of the respondents, all names and positions have been removed and the attributions randomised. We provide in Appendix 1 a list of organisations used in this research in a randomised order.
The themes presented in the results section below were derived from both top-down coding based on the research questions and literature, and bottom-up coding derived from the interview transcripts, an approach similar to that used by Heffron (2013) . Once transcribed and collated the interview transcripts were systematically coded and analysed using NVivo. Following Thomas and Harden (2008: 8) , the process comprised three stages, (1) the free line-by-line coding of data sources, (2) the organisation of these 'free codes' into 'descriptive' themes and (3) the development of 'analytical' themes, which form the basis of the results presented in the results. More specifically, during the first phase of top-down coding using NVivo, excerpts, quotations and passages were coded into themes conforming to the interview question framework, focussing on distributional justice, justice as recognition and procedural justice. Following explorations of similarities and differences between the emergent codes, new group codes were then created that captured the meanings of information within them. The themes represent common threads of discussion and topics of concern raised by the 
Results
This section now focuses on the main results of this investigation: interviewee answers to the question 'justice by whom?'. Across the two sample groups, NGO and policy, there was recognition that although all actors play some role in the provision of energy justice, industry and policy bodies carry the majority of the responsibility for the justice concerns raised by interviewees. Illustrative examples are provided in the following paragraphs. The results reflect on both evaluative and normative (see Table 1 ) examinations as respondents considered (1) who is responsible (evaluative) and (2) who ought to be responsible (normative). Further, respondents reflected both on their own responsibilities and on those of others, acknowledging, therefore, that all groups represented in this research study -NGOs and policy elite (as defined above) respondents -are involved in both the production and continuation of energy justice.
NGOs perceptions of responsibility
We begin with an assessment of NGO respondents' responses. From both an evaluative and normative perspective, interviewees primarily allocated most of the responsibility to the government, as well as to other policy organisations. In this regard, and in comparison to non-NGO organisations, there was an evident lack of self-reflection. An anti-nuclear campaigner (interview 7) reflected firstly on the responsibility of external industry and policy groups, representing a focus on "people at the top". For the respondent, this included EDF workers, the now defunct government Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC), the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The interviewee expressed the view that these groups and individuals should be questioning whether investing in Hinkley Point C is sensible or not, and was adamant that it is not. Government oversight was not, in the interviewee's opinion, being performed well. These types of views were consistent across the NGO community.
Restating the importance of the DECC and the ONR in decision-making around Hinkley Point, a separate NGO respondent (interview 13), not only highlighted the influential role of government employees, but questioned their suitability for having a consultative role at all. They noted in particular that when their organisation attended DECC and ONR meetings, a large contingent of the DECC representatives "were recent graduates from Oxford and Cambridge" (interview 13). Given their youth, the respondent believed that they lacked historical awareness and experience -including knowledge of the 1988 Hinkley Point C inquiry and the Flowers Report (1976), for example. In their view, without a working oral history and information being passed on, they believed that they were not able to adequately address the questions that they were being asked.
Thus, despite their apparent authority and responsibility, they were unable to fulfil their role.
There was a feeling among NGO respondents too, that questions around responsibility are made more complex by a severe lack of transparency. A member (interview 3) of an anti-nuclear campaign group highlighted the difficulty of identifying who is ultimately responsible in stating that;
"(Y)ou can not say who because we have structured our society in ways and
we have put procedures in place that perpetuate this and all the other stuff that we are getting completely wrong".
The interviewee concluded that whilst the government might be described as being ultimately responsible, the government is hard to define, is constantly evolving and one respondent articulated above, may be ineffective. Thus, the opaque myriad of decision makers hides who is currently responsible. They also added that "companies come and go and EDF probably will not exist in 150 years" (interview 3). This pointed towards a long-term focus on government, rather than on companies. Private businesses are looked upon as temporarily involved in profit making without having a long-term buy in to any consequences. Government was, therefore, positioned as the actor who 'should' be responsible, even if the definition of it is illusive.
In addition to the predominant government focus, there were also some instances where self-reflection was evident. NGO respondents also discussed their own on-going responsibility as contributors to energy justice given their assumed role in commenting on operations at the Hinkley Point site. An NGO member stated that part of what makes her continue to work on the nuclear issue is her own sense of responsibility to both wider society and "to her children and as yet unborn grandchildren" (interview 9). Further, a different respondent (interview 4) pointed out that, historically, NGOs were paid to make such contributions, raising the example of when Greenpeace was employed during the 1988 inquiry. Now the respondent believes that, despite on-going engagement and interest, without external funding the NGO community is not big enough to make a notable impact. Building the case for the role of NGOs, another respondent (interview 2) drew on personal experiences of the latest Hinkley Point inquiry which gave them the impression that;
"(T)he people who were making the decisions were relying on groups like us, and other NGOs presumably, to point things out to them so that they could investigate it a bit further".
However, the respondent (interview 2) did reflect negatively on whether that was appropriate, commenting that, at the time, they thought;
"(W)ow, this is worrying because I have only been involved with this for a little time and they are actually going to look at what my comments are to decide on what they are looking at".
Here, where responsibility was given, it was received somewhat uncomfortably.
Non-NGO perceptions on responsibility
Policy groups (business, government and other associated actors) also explicitly attribute responsibility for the enactment of energy justice throughout the conducted interviews. The data pointed towards a similar observation found in the NGO interviews. The government, companies and regulators are the primary subjects of responsibility -and indeed they are aware of this. This meant that selfreflection was more evident among non-NGO groups. They differ to the NGO interpretations above, however, with regards to the perceived lack of transparency or long-term responsibility held by government. One respondent (interview 15) suggested that, since the privatisation of the energy sector, the responsibility for energy justice has been "shared between the industry and the government". This is based on the idea that, firstly, the industry wants to make money from new developments, therefore that it is in their interests to ensure that they can do so, and secondly, that the government wants to ensure continuity of supply for its citizens. Responsibility was attributed to regulators and site developers as an outcome of government procedures.
A more nuanced sense of responsibility is evident in so far as each of the policy actors -government, business and regulators -all have different types of responsibility which drives a sense of due process. A representative (interview 16) from an energy company stated, for example, that following the reviews on their planning application they must prove an understanding of all issues and undertake appropriate checks. In this regard, it was their responsibility to ensure due process with oversight from government bodies. The responsibility of a company is, from the interviewee (16) perspective, to complete all due diligence, whilst the regulator is to ensure compliance, leaving government to oversee the "bigger picture".
From a government perspective, interview data pointed towards a sense of broader responsibility -fitting in with the interpretation presented above.
Companies and regulators fulfil legal obligations whilst the government took responsibility for the overall energy policy landscape, and thereby the justice implications of broader energy decisions. One national government representative (interview 25) identified that his overall responsibility was to "provide energy to the national population", who he believed were primarily "concerned with affordable prices". He then outlined government's responsibility to assist business and industry as (1) "they were reliant on large quantities of base-load energy" and (2) the nuclear industry and associated wider industry groups themselves "created and sustained a broad spectrum of jobs and careers" that could materialise -in this case -as a new fleet of nuclear power stations. In this regard, the results demonstrated a sense of dual responsibility to both the citizen and business. Responsibility for policy elite actors is, therefore, understood to be a sophisticated process of checks and balances.
Some respondents (interview 20, 25) did refer to a 'checks and balances' approach as encouraging a 'minimal compliance' mind-set, giving a less positive overview of the drivers of due process. Another policy interview (17) Policy interviews have, therefore, revealed a nuanced triple lock (businessregulator -government) approach to responsibility, which is perhaps designed to ensure (only) minimal senses of justice. This nuanced approach to responsibility is also apparent from a representative from a local District Council (interview 22).
The interviewee gave attention to not only policy groups at the national level, but at the local level too as they discussed the responsibility of local councillors and MPs to serve as a conduit for information provision. It was suggested, as an illustration, that the role of the Parish Council was to guide local groups, "let them digest the information and with time, develop their own opinions". The interviewee also identified complexities in the jurisdiction of local bodies, however, as, in this case, most developments were considered by Sedgemoor District Council despite the fact that the station itself is in West Somerset. This resulted in difficulties in establishing exactly where 'local responsibility' lies.
In summary, notions of responsibility are explicitly held by both NGOs and policy elites (as defined in section 3). This includes, in most instances, responsibility held by government, regulators and companies, but the results presented above uncover some notable differences. NGOs allocate current responsibility to government and companies, whilst placing a significantly higher focus on government over the long-term. Policy elite actors allocate responsibility to a complex system of multi-level checks and balances in decision-making. We discuss the implications of these findings in the next section.
Discussion
Articulations of 'justice by whom?' emphasised that for both NGOs and nonNGOs, government, regulators and industry hold a greater degree of responsibility for the provision of energy justice than other actors in the nuclear energy system. This finding contrasts with the social connection model of Young (2011) , which states that all those who contribute by their actions to structural processes with some unjust outcomes share responsibility for the injustice, and suggests that "structural injustices" remain within nuclear energy policy. Transparency emerges in our study as a key determining factor in how responsibility is allocated by organisations. Indeed, in her earlier work, Young alludes to the importance of "increasing (the) transparency of connections" as means to deconstructing structural injustices (Young, 2004: : 388) . This finding carries implications for future energy policy and industry strategy, as society considers not only the need for new, often low-carbon infrastructure, but also for long-term, socially-sensitive energy developments. We argue below that nuanced multi-scalar and multi-actor systems are more achievable when there is a heightened level of transparency in decision-making.
Dispersed versus centralised notions of responsibility
Interview respondents in our study reflected both on their own responsibilities and on the responsibility of others to varying degrees, acknowledging that all groups represented -NGOs and policy elites -are involved in both the production and continuation of energy justice. This reinforces the argument of Sovacool et al. (2014: 199) that, as each of us participate in the global energy system, each of us contributes to energy injustices because the decisions that we make about which electricity company to patronise, for example, have moral and ethical implications.
Furthering this statement, Sovacool et al. (2016: 5) later add that contemporary analysts, policymakers and even consumers should reconsider their energy decisions as not only technical, economic or even environmental concerns, but also moral ones.
Yet whilst the results demonstrated a shared opinion that everyone has responsibility for the production of energy justice, they also indicate that government and industry are assumed to carry more. This was a consistent finding; NGO and policy respondents shared the view that certain industry and especially governmental, including the Secretary of State, and government bodies such as DECC, the ONR, the Department of Business, the Health Services Commissioner, and the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, held more influence over energy justice outcomes. Thus, the research findings illustrate that the question is not simply who is responsible for the provision of energy justice, but who has the highest degree of responsibility -calling into question dispersed understandings of responsibility that currently populate energy justice literature.
Energy justice scholars , Jenkins et al. 2016 , McCauley et al. 2013 , Sovacool and Dworkin 2015 have consistently argued that "we all"
(from government and business to citizens and academics) have a responsibility to ensure that energy justice is achieved. Our findings suggest that this is possible, but only if "we all" feel empowered with a sense of understanding who is responsible for what. Damgaard et al. (2017) revealed in their study of biofuels in Nepal that individuals adopted a greater sense of responsibility in producing and consuming energy when they understood how their biofuel energy system worked, and that they had to maintain it. Our study goes further by suggesting that when parts of society (in this case NGOs) do not feel empowered with a sense of understanding, more narrow centralised forms of responsibility emergefocusing in this case on government. Sovacool and Dworkin (2015: 440) recognise that we need to make energy decisions that promote responsibility, including attention to the minimisation of negative externalities, or energy-related social and environmental costs. They continue that "this element of energy justice is perhaps the most controversial and complex, as it blends together four somewhat different notions of "responsibility": a responsibility of governments to minimise environmental degradation, a responsibility of industrialised countries responsible for climate change to pay to fix the problem (the so-called "polluter pays principle"), a responsibility of current generations to protect future ones, and a responsibility of humans to recognise the intrinsic value of non-human species, adhering to a sort of "environmental ethic"'.
Notwithstanding the truth of these claims, we identify that a shift in attention is required from different instances of responsibility to understanding the individuals and organisations that are attributed responsibility for them.
Transparency as key determinant of models of responsibility
The ultimate objective of a dispersed collective sense of responsibility, like Young's social connection model, assumes and requires transparency. In our study, the NGOs adoption of a largely centralized, narrow government focused sense of responsibility contrasted with the 'policy elite' approach which prioritized a more nuanced dispersed but minimal view of responsibility. We identify transparency as critical to the adoption of these 'models' by the actors in question. In line with Reese and Jacob (2015) , a perceived lack of transparency drove a sense of moral anger among NGOs, resulting in our study in a disconnect with other actors such as business or regulators. On the other hand, government, business and regulators all felt empowered with a sense of knowing how the system worked -but ultimately leading to a bottom line approach.
Nonetheless, in discussing notions of responsibility, both sets of interviewees advanced the typical application of justice as recognition, which has focused on the recipients of benefits or ills only, rather than those who create them. The respondents also highlighted, as outlined above, who is perceived to be responsible for remediating injustices, or conversely, ensuring the continuation of just practices. This supports the work of Heffron et al. (2015) who argue a central purpose of energy justice is to identify how practitioners can critically evaluate the impacts of energy policies and how best they can respond -thus attributing accountability. Simultaneously, however, it raises the question of who the 'practitioners' are and the central issue of transparency in defining which roles they do, and should play.
Conclusions and policy implications
Our findings are taken to be illustrative and represent only an early exploration of responsibility discourses -an initial exploratory platform for future development.
Future research in this area would benefit from taking more discrete industry or policy stances. This would be possible given a longer research timespan and with stronger pre-existing research networks, which are especially important given that the UK nuclear sector is currently highly-studied and politically charged. We conclude, therefore, with some implications of this research for policy, and the potential for future similar investigations.
Although efforts to make energy policy participatory and more transparent through the planning processes is well established, there is a continued need to engage with ideas of energy justice within energy policy, overcoming what Markowitz and Shari (2012) identify as a moral vacuum in energy decisionmaking. Here, the emphasis is on a socially-oriented energy policy cognisant of the energy justice implications -both positive and negative -of the energy infrastructure we pursue. Ensuring that transparency is upheld throughout the policy process is critical. In the UK's case, as well as for the other 31 countries currently utilising or pursuing nuclear technology (WNA 2016) , this includes continued, detailed attention to the different perceptions of responsibility raised by nuclear power, both in principle and in practice. Only with full transparency does it become clear who is responsible for what, and therefore how to work towards just energy provision and decision-making.
We support Jenkins et al. (2017) in the need to reflect upon the sourcespecific implications of an energy form such as nuclear power as well as their role within the wider energy mix. Despite using a nuclear energy case to develop our arguments, we suggest that policy-oriented approaches to energy justice and responsibility are important for every energy source. In 2015 nuclear energy production in the UK provided 20.8% of total electricity generation (DECC 2016), with the remainder made up of a mix of gas, coal, oil and renewables. Thus, the discourses presented here represent a small fraction of those raised by energy production, and do not capture the full range of justice issues associated with energy use. Each energy source in an energy mix (the justice nature of which is inevitably contested) is characterised by a different balance of benefits and negatives and involves a different mix of 'responsible actors' depending on whether the energy form is centralised or decentralised. Thus, this paper is not only contributing to nuclear energy justice dialogs, but opens new avenues to explore responsibility for energy justice in the context of other energy forms.
Consequently, this paper raises issues which could fruitfully be explored in the context of other energy technologies.
Finally, we acknowledge that there are difficulties associated with responsibility, as seen in the climate and environmental justice movements. How should responsibility be mandated? Who governs and monitors it? Is it open to exploitation? Indeed, the suggestion that some groups hold a higher degree of responsibility may in itself generate conflict. For example, Stirling (2014) states that attributing responsibility may reduce collective capacities for open, progressive, plural and critical political discourse. Thus, we re-assert that wider society and other actor groups retain an important role in assessing just energy policy. Using the example of climate justice and emissions, Vanderheiden (2008) explains that citizens of democratic societies have responsibility for the (in)actions of their governments, where they must use their democratic means to fight ineffective policies.
Secondly, we caution the expectation that transparency will always lead to dispersed collective senses of responsibility. Heyd (2012) refers, for example, to the impossibility of what he calls "prospective justice", whereby individuals or whole nations extend their concern for welfare and social position to all peoples.
The breadth expected in cosmopolitan or collective models permits, necessarily, the diffusion of responsibility. By 'diffusion of responsibility' -in line with Martin and North (2015) -we mean that each person or group is less likely to take responsibility for an action or inaction -in this case, an issue of energy justicewhen other people/groups are also implicated as they may assume that others are either responsible for taking action or have already done so. Kurosawa (1992) reminds us further that such processes of diffusion are to be expected in some cultures (especially individualistic ones), more than others. As this is the case, we highlight the necessity of regular, reflexive reassessments of who is responsible, and how successfully transparency is being achieved.
Nonetheless, despite the acknowledged difficulty of attributing responsibility, an energy justice perspective is required to complement the conventional focus of energy studies on the costs of certain energy choices and technologies in order to fulfil environmental, economic and social energy criteria.
